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COMPARATIVE CONFLICTS LAW

AN INTERIM ACCOUNT ON COMPARATIVE
CONFLICTS LAW

Ernst Rabel*

U

NDER the sponsorship of the American "Law Institute and subsequently of the University of Michigan, with the efficient
assistance of the Faculty, notably of Hessel E. Y ntema as editor, I
published the first volume of a work on conflicts law in 1945. A second
volume has just followed, after a long delay caused by the vicissitudes
of postwar printing. The greater part of a third volume has been
readied in the meantime, but its date of publication is not yet fixed.1
The task consists in surveying the existing and proposed conflicts
rules of the world and in ascertaining their background, purposes, and
social effects as exactly as the available sources permit. We should be
able by such research to devote the manifold advantages of comparative studies to the urgent needs of a branch of law which at present
bears the name of private international law as if by irony, like lucus
a non lucendo.
The critics of the first volume have shown generous understanding
and benevolence. I am particularly appreciative of the general con-

*

Dr. jur., Dr. hon. c., Athens. Former Professor of Law at the University of
Berlin and Director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Foreign and International
Private Law; one-time member of the Permanent Court of International Justice at
The Hague.-Ed.
1
THE CONFLICT OF LAws: A COMPARATIVE STUDY. Michigan Legal Studies.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Chicago: Callaghan & Co. Vol. 1, Introduction and Family Law; vol. 2, Corporations, Torts, Contracts in general; vol. 3,
Special Contracts.
In the well-meaning opinion of Professor Farage, 46 Cot. L. REV. 337 (1946),
this title does not convey the importance of the subject. In view of his remarks, I
should like to say that in my view there are three kinds of comparative studies connected with conflicts law; (I) Comparative private law in fragmentary portions has
often figured in cases with foreign elements. Courts want to know the results of the
application of the several laws in question. Scholars have shown the same interest
on a higher level and should do their best to verify the interplay of conflicts rules.
(2) The instant work compares with each other the conflicts rules of the various
jurisdictions. This task is different only in scope and intensity from the consideration
given in American courts to conflicts rules of other American states and of England.
But it is exacting enough to form the main subject of the work and therefore is
exclusively indicated by the title. Finally (3) th(, exact relation between the private
laws of all systems and the conflicts rules ( existing or desirable) should be examined
in order both to adjust the conflicts rules to the r~ality of the legal world and to
assure their necessary independent function. This is one of my principal postulates
but requires special inquiries for which the present research furnishes only contributions.
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firmation that the citations are precise, which is due to the careful
checking and rechecking of the materials by the research staff at the
University of Michigan Law School.2
From the point now reached in the pursuit of the study, a resume
of certain characteristic phenomena may be of some value. Not that
the time for final conclusions has come, when the "general doctrines"
of conflicts law may be discussed with real knowledge of the entire
matter. But the abundant facts accumulating shed so much light on
the nature and technique of this branch of law as to suggest a few
observations with respect thereto. At the same time the prevailingly
negative statements of the second volume, respecting the use of conflicts rules for contracts in general, may here be accompanied by a
few illustrations of desirable rules which the study of special contracts
in the third volume will reveal.
Our first attention is due to the very raison d'etre of conflicts law.
There are thoughful people who seem to prefer to see it crippled!

The International Function of Conflicts Law
Conflicts law is a sore spot in every country of the world, excepting
those where courts overlook the conflicts problem altogether, an idyllic
method still quite popular with many Latin-American courts. The
apparently simple question of what law governs a certain case has led
to many theories and to great confusion. All the theories have been
exceedingly learned and full of useful ideas but often, especially in
the United States from Story to Minor to Beale, built on treacherous
ground. "Confusion" is an ominously often-recurring word in the discussion of this field. Some observers, indeed, speak of a legal labyrinth
2
An objection has been raised by my eminent and highly esteemed English
colleague, H. C. Gutteridge, 63 L. Q. Rev. 112 (1946) against Volume I, p. 375,
n. 181 where I referred to a rule expressed by Vaughan Williams, L. J. in the case of
In re Martin, Loustalan v. Loustalan, [1900] P. 211 at 240. Did I really take an
obiter dictum as authoritative, as Gutteridge suggests? What Vaughan Williams expressed in the specific language of conflicts law and is therefore reproduced separately
in the headnote, is the same rule that Lindley, M. R. at p. 228 states among "the
principles which ••• ought to be applied to the case" and terms as "the real question
on which this case turns." The same is necessarily implied in the opinion of Rigby,
L. J., at p. 235. Falconbridge, 15 CAN. B. REV. 227 (1937), and CHESHIRE, Pruv.
INT. LAw 523 (1935) share in this view. Gutteridge notes correctly that occasionally
I have cited, e.g., Swiss sources, in connection with English law. I should have
mentioned generally that I .think it valuable to collect trustworthy but unorthodox
utterances showing, for instance, how the international working of English law impresses a Swiss lawyer or how it is described by expert opinion in the report of a
SwiiS lawsuit. Common discussion needs such information. Thus far, I have not been
able to do much in this direction.
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and of a bankrupt branch of law. A profusion of legal thinking has
been affected by some vicious ailment. What is it that disturbs the
same branch of legal science and technique in the same manner in all
countries, although with a variety of intensity and effects?
The diagnosis of the evil is very easy and so will be its cure, if
consideration be directed to the whole body of international life instead
of the part one nation, or one state, takes in the intercourse of persons
and goods. How would a railway train operate from Chicago to San
Francisco, if the gauge of the tracks changed from state to state, after
the model of Russia where the gauge is different from all other
European networks? Or how would an orchestra sound if every instrument were tuned to a different key? Exactly this has happened in the
last sixty years to private "international" law. When it was discovered
that it had no anchorage in universal custom or the law of nations, but
was a part of municipal law, it was promptly adjusted, mentally and
bodily, to the domestic climate of each particular country. In a formerly widely held opinion which enlists the renewed enthusiasm of
a few recent writers,3 conflicts law serves principally the interests and
predilections of the particular state. In a less articulate manner and
without the ruthless nationalism of Niboyet and the Civil Code of ,
Peru, the law for marriage and divorce, successions and contracts is
selected everywhere according to some arbitrary policy, or simply the
law of the forum is applied. An Italian emigrating to Argentina is
treated in Argentina under that country's law of marriage, legitimation, adoption, and inheritance, although he and his issue will be
treated in the same matters by the Italian standard in his native land.
A North Carolina couple will be divorced in Nevada against the law
of their matrimonial domicil, and the divorce must even be recognized
in all states if the plaintiff spouse establishes a "real" domicil in Reno,
even though it should last for only six weeks. The identical marriage
may be considered valid in one state, invalid in another, validly celebrated but dissolved in a third. What becomes of the children and
their issue, and of the matrimonial property and inheritance of the
spouses, are nice subjects for statutes, cases, and annotators. A corporation created in Delaware with headquarters in Belgium· for exploiting mines in Bolivia is a possible creature, but the kinds of surprises
it may experience are too much for imagination. On many topics the
conflicts rules seem objectively dr~fted, although tjiey are different
8
Vol. 1, pp. 75 ff.; vol. 2, pp. 556-558; Book Review on N1BOYET, TRAITE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE FRANgA1s, Tome III, 59 HARV. L. REv. 1327-1334
(1946).
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and thereby objectionable, but there are innumerable technical devices
to make them apply in favor of lex f ori.
.
The evil is unprincipled expansion of the domestic laws, and the
remedy is a conscious orientation towards harmony.
Let us carefully preserve the few almost universal conflicts rules
inherited from past awareness of the legal community, such as the
lex situs for property, the personal law of corporations,4 the law of the
place of wrong for tort liability/ and let us modify slightly the American practice concerning the form of contracts,6 so as to adopt the principle of locus regit actum. The British deviation from the universal
tort principle is justly known as an expression of insularism.7
Even before the British Legitimacy Act of 1926; English courts
recognized foreign legitimation by, subsequent marriage of the parents.
Yet ,according to Dicey, Beale, and the Restatement of the Law of
Conflicts of Law (section 120), a status unknown to the forum is nonexistent in the forum. 8 Such extreme territorialism is prevailingly rejected. Nevertheless, there is a tendency to cut down foreign-created
legal acts to the inferior measure , of some domestic institution considered analogous. Thus, there is a diyision in the American decisions
,concerning the effect of a foreign adoption on succession by, from, and
through an adopted child, when the statutes of distribution differ. The
Restatement (section 143) would give it the same effect as a domestic
adoption. The only consistent solution is found in a statute of Quebec:
the adopted person shall have the same rights of succession as he
would have had in the country in which he was adopted.9 Foreign
d~ath statutes were initially applied only if substantially similar to the
law of the fqrum. 1 ° Foreign corporations are said, in very numerous
American constitutions and statutes, as well as by foreign writers and
laws, to have no more powers than domestic corporations of a similar
kind.11 Fortunately, American courts have 'instinctively refrained from
a harmful use of this inconsiderate idea and have reduced it practically
to the just enforcement· of basic commercial policy.12 Yet in Latin
America, it is not a rare occurrence that foreign corporations are re4

Vol. 2, Part Six.
Vol. 2, Part Seven.
6
Vol. 2, pp. 485 ff., 515.
7
Vol. 2, pp. 239-244, 347, note 57.
8
Vol. 1, ·pp. 175-178, 558, 592, 646, 650.
9
Vol. 1, pp. 648, 651 ff.
io Vol. 2, pp. 237 £.
11
Vol. 2, pp'. 149 ff.
12
Vol. 2, pp. 154-157.
5
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quired to live up to the same provisions on subscription stock and
paid-in stock, or on allocations to the reserve fund, as domestic corporations.18 Subjection to the domestic standard, where the local branch
or agency is not concerned, is a very frequent abuse in Latin-American
and other countries.14 Curiously, the proclaimed equal right of foreign
with domestic organizations, in addition to su:ffering acute exceptions,
is perverted to create unjust requirements; it has become quite as much
of an impediment to international business life as discriminatory
measures can be. Equality, once more, should mean measuring of
equal things by equal standards.
There is no such arbitrariness in the judicially buttressed American
system of unlimited recognition and conditional admission to the doing
of business, a sound middle cours~ between English liberalism and
arbitrary discretion in many other countries.15 Also the numerous
abuses in supervising the activity of foreigners within the states and
in punishing failure to comply with licensing or registration statutes,
sometimes even depriving a foreign corporation not doing any business
in the forum from bringing an action, are alien to this country, with
some minor exceptions which, in fact, should be repealed for the sake
of a good example.16
Another type of trespass into the neighbor's sphere may end this
list. In determining the personal law of in9ividuals, governing family
relations and in most countries also capacity and other incidents of
"status," the systems have been fundamentally divided into followers
of the law of domicil--common law countries and others-and those
considering nationality as the decisive connection with a state. But in
an increasing number of Latin-American codes both tests are used
cumulatively to extend the control of the state, including both
foreigners living in the forum and nationals living anywhere.17 While
the coexistence of the two principles in the world causes grievous hardships, their ambitious· combination within one state removes any possibility of international harmony. Similar double-acting provisions in
Italy, Argentina, Japan, and other countries subject corporations to
full domestic control not only when they are domiciled but also when
they have their main activity in the country.18
18 Vol. 2,
14
Vol. 2,
15 Vol. 2,
16 Vol. 2,

pp.
pp.
pp.
pp.
17
Vol. 1, pp.
18
Vol. 2, pp.

184, 199.
197 ff.
173, 181, 183.
213-215, 222.
117-119.
46-49.
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It may be added that Soviet Russia from its beginning has been
hostile to foreign law.
Choice of Law
Our familiar conflicts rules are essentially restricted to the life
situations characteristic of private law, as opposed not only to procedure but also to administrative law, jurisdiction of courts, and penal
law.
Private law is a concept worthy of attention. As a basic principle,
we must admit that private laws of civilized states are interchangeable,
while public laws are not. This has its significance in the vexed problem
of "public policy." 19
·
Better known is the analogous contrast between substantive law,
subject to choice of law, and civil procedure, which is traditionally
regulated by local legislation and rules· of court. This sharp distinction
cannot be fully maintained under the intricate modern conditions,20 but
it exists and raises special difficulties when the line of separation .is
traced at different points. The exaggerated scope· of the concept of
procedure in the English tradition, however, is shrinking. In the
,United States, definitely, the Statute of Frauds has become subject
to the conflicts rule concerning formalities. 2 1. Limitation of action is
more and more considered an incident of the cause of action, hence a
substantive institution, as it has always been in the civil law countries.
Where this is the case under the law governing an obligation, all
courts ought to apply the provision.22 Presumptions of fault and legal
burdens of proof contain objective elements sufficient for application
in foreign courts.28
Judicial jurisdiction is consistently separated from choice of law
in the civil law doctrines. Their close co~ection in the· American
doctrine, visible in the Conflicts Restatement, is strikingly illustrated
in the treatment of divorce as a subject exclusively of jurisdiction.24
A court taking cognizance of a divorce suit as a matter of course applies
the statute of its own state. This happens also in Soviet Russia and
allegedly in a few Scandinavian countries. It is otherwise in Europe
and Latin America, where jurisdiction is assumed according to rules
19

20

279.

Vol. 2, pp. 558 ff.
E.g., for court consent

to adoption, vol.

1,

I
21

Vol. 1, pp. 50 ff., vol. 2, pp. 498 ff.
Vol. 1, p. 64.
28
Vol. 2, pp. 283 ff., 545.
24 Vol. 1, pp. 390 ff., 422-424.
22

p. 640; form of damages, vol.

2,

P··
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of judicial organization, and if it is granted, the applicable divorce
law must be ascertained according to the rules of choice of law. The
law applied is that of the matrimonial domicil under the Treaties of
Montevideo and Habana; that of the nationality of the husband in
England, Germany, and Italy; and that of the last common nationality
of the spouses under the Hague Convention, in Poland, and Greece,
with many variants and complications.25 This contrast raises, among
other problems, the two following questions pertinent to much regretted disadvantages of the American system:
First, is it sound to accept divorce suits brought by foreign domiciliaries, as extensively as it has been done despite very different rules
of jurisdiction? In the United States the need is acutely felt for
restrictive measures to avoid the ensuing complications. Many curiously varied and cumulated requirements have been adopted in the statutes
in order to make access to the courts more selective. But the divorce
mills flourish nevertheless, either because the law is only in the books
or because the statutes have made their main barrier-the requirement
of a period of domicil-illusory by reducing it to a nominal period such
as six weeks. 20 A more effective prohibition against assuming jurisdiction, but one unavailable in the United States, appears in Germany
and Switzerland, in case the jurisdiction over divorce or the divorce
decree would not be recognized in the national country of the husband. 27 The right remedy has been proposed by the American reform
drafts which make the so-called residence requirement-domicil plus
residence during one year--compulsory. 28
Second, jurisdiction on_ce assumed, is it natural that the lex f ori
should determine whether and for what causes divorce is permissible?
We should say not. Especially the American system, where divorce
jurisdiction is predicated upon the ground of only one party's domicil
and at the same time the court administers exclusively its own divorce
law, seems explicable solely in terms of historical residues. But the
continental refinements are no more attractive, since they require conVol. 1, pp. 426 ff.
Vol. 1, pp. 407-410.
27
Vol. 1, pp. 411-413.
28
The requirement of a "minimum residence time," advocated by the author
in 28 lowA L. REV. 190 at 223 (1943h and in the .present work, vol. 1, p. 460, means
"domicil and, in most jurisdictions, actual presence in the state as well, Jthough a
temporary absence is innocuous," id. at 207, vol. 1, p. 409, citing I BEALE, CoNFLICI'
OF LAws, § I0.8 (1935). This fact must nave escaped Cheshire, "The International
Validity of Divorces,"· 61 L. Q. REV. 352 at 371 (1945). I have therefore not been
satisfied with mere residence, as he assumes, see vol. 1, p. 515.
25
26
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sideration of both the national law of the parties and the law of the
forum. If the parties are or originally were of different nationality,
various ideas prevail. Laden with complication, th~ principle has been
rejected by leading courts in critical instances.29
However, no reason exists why in the case of divided domicils of
the parties one should be preferred to the other. The law of the last
common domicil recommends itself.
Also, when a divorce court awards custody of children, the rules
should not be taken from the law of the forum but from that governing
filiation matters. That the applicant has succeeded in obtaining the
forum for divorce is no ground for changing the rules of custody.30
Mechanical and Rational Rules

One would expect conflicts rules no less than other legal rules
to serve reasonable purposes. But without any functional approach,
the primitive conflicts doctrines of the former centuries, including the
nineteenth, were satisfied with a few crude rules conceived a priori
out of some scholastic imaginations. Contract law, the main :vehicle
of modern business, has been an outstanding victim of these quaint
methods to this very day. New Brazilian and Italian laws, both of
I 942, profess, like the French courts, the general rule that all con1
tracts are governed by the law of the place where they are made. The
German courts and the treaties of Montevideo declare instead in the
same cases for the law of the place of performance. The American
Restatement of 1934 and the Swiss federal tribunal, intermediate between these systems, obscurely determine all contracts as respects
validity ("or effects," adds the Restatement, section 332) under the
lex loci contractus and the remaining questions under the lex loci
solutionis. A few American statutes have adopted one or the otherof such devices. 31 That all these are bloodless and unworkable formulas, seems not yet common knowledge. We may still encounter in
courts tired of lex loci contractus Story's strangely illogical predication
29

Vol. 1, pp. 429-450, 583 ff., 618-622.
Vol. 1, pp. 533 f.
Law of the place of contracting: Georgia: Code Ann. (1937) § ,102-108 (8);
cf. Oregon: Code (1930) § 2-215.
Law of the place of performance, certain states adopting this rule from the Field
Code: California: Civ. Code (Deering, 1941) § 1646; Montana: Rev. Code (1935)
c. 108, § 7537; North Dakota: Rev. Code (1943) § 9-0·711; Oklahoma: Stat. (1941)
tit. 15, § 162; South Dakota: Code (1939) § 10.0106.
Law of the place of performance for "effects": Louisiana: Civ. Code (Dart,
1945) Art. 10, 1f 2.
30
31
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that a contract is governed by the law of the place of contracting, except when performance is to be made in another state, in which case
the latter's law is applicable. If contracting and performance are to be
in the same state, the former is the criterion; if they are separated,
the latter decides! Another trick is that of calling any desired contact
the place of contracting.32
•
Rules of this kind seemed to make sense to the statutist scholars
four to six hundred years ago. Application of the lex loci contractus
was supported by naive speculation that a contract is "created" by the
territorial power of a lord and therefore "born" with the local law
attached to it, similar to the status with which an individual is born
subject to the sovereign.38
American legal language and technique has preserved far more
of these feudal remainders than any other country's literature. Beale
and the Conflicts Restatement use the full equipment of territorial
theories. They let a contract be "created" by the law of the place of
contracting,34 as they sanction Huber's axiom that law can operate only
in the state where it is made,85 and Judge Taney's word that a corporation exists only in the state where it is incorporated.36
The effect of such ritualism may be seen. in decisions such as that
in Milliken v. Pratt,81 often cited without criticism. A married woman
at her marital domicil in Massachusetts delivered a note to her husband, guaranteeing his debt. The husband sent it by mail to his creditor
in Maine. Although under the law of Massachusetts, the forum, she
could not bind herself, the court held her liable under the law of
Maine, because "if the contract is completed in another state, it makes
no difference in principle whether the citizen of this state goes in person or sends an agent, or writes a letter across the boundary line between the two states." She contracted as if personally present in Maine.
This reasoning was supported by an English precedent on the theory
that a principal is deemed to be present at the place where his agent
contracts-that is the questionable old identity fiction, confusingly
used in conflicts law. At the same time, the decision takes it for granted
that the place of making the contract determines the law, which in
this simple form has no justification. It is usually assumed, furtherVol. 2, pp. 461-463.
Vol. 2, pp. 443-445, 448-449.
34
CoNFLICTS RESTATEMENT, Scope Note before§ 311 (1934).
35
Vol. 1, p. 61.
86
Vol. 2, pp. 124 ff.
87
125 Mass. 374 (1878). Cf. CooK, THE LoG1cAL AND LEGAL BAsES· OF THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 22 ff. (1942).
32

88
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more, that for the purpose of the "law of the place where a contract
is made" the contract is considered made at the place where the last
act completing it is made, a most tenacious idea, presupposing :finally
that this place is to be found by applying the municipal rule deciding
at what time a contract is perfected. This is another puzzle, because
the private laws differ greatly on this question. But from the same
premises the contrary result was reached in the case of Freeman's
Appeal 38 where the married woman likewise delivered her note at
their domicil in Connecticut to her husband who then mailed it to
~his partner in Illinois, who in turn handed it there to the creditor.
The Connecticut court distinguished the precedents, arguing that the
woman had only constituted an agency within the state and that it was
invalid for want of capacity. The distinction would astonish a layman.
Str1pped from all the legalistic finesses, the question should not have
been where the agency or the guarantee. was made, but whether the
restriction of the wife's capacity by the law of her matrimonial domicil
governed only her notes made to domestic creditors, or embraced her
obligations entered into with any creditor, wherever residing. This
question has never been faced squarely, but the majority of decisions,
taking the position of Milliken v. Pratt, have reduced substantially
the extraterritorial effect of the restrictions on capacity. They may
be regarded as an important, though concealed, step in the historic
process of women's emancipation, rather than as authority for the
mysterious force of lex loci contractus in determining capacity or in
constituting an agent.
The general conflicts rules concerning contracts produce uncertainty, inconsistency, and arbitrariness. Their defects defy remedies,
such as the proposal to give preference to the law validating a contract
or a contract clause. This may be just a palliative in certain situations.89
The· real cure includes two propositions: choice of law by the parties
should be favored, and in its absence the court should look to the
center of the contractual relationship. _
The practice of English, French, German, Swedish, and Swiss
courts demonstrates the wholesome operation of unfettered party
autonomy. Contrary to the teaching of innumerable French -and other
authors' who have become influential on the American literature, the
parties to a contract are authorized to select their law, without excepting the "imperative" rules of some predestined law. Study of the
38

2

68 Conn. 533, 37 A. 420 (1897). On contrary decisions of Connecticut, see
LAws 1126, note 3 (1935).
.
Vol. 2, pp. 474 ff.

BEALE, CoNFLICT OF
39
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American cases reveals that in their overwhelming majority, though
with notable exceptions, they are far from sharing either in Beale's
absolute elimination of the parties' choice of law, or in any variant of
the dominant theories prohibiting the choice of a law not "substantially'~
connected with the contract, or excluding important incidents such as
the formation of the contract from the stipulated law. Yet, the judicial
declaration of this freedom qf contracting might be more articulate and
wholehearted. The parties and their counsel ought to be sure in
making interstate and international transactions that their stipulation
of an applicable law will be respected, and they should not fail to
insert appropriate clauses, which thus far are frequent but not common
and for good reasons should even accompany arbitration clauses.
The agreement may be express or implied by conduct. Where an
intention of the parties is merely "presumed," the judge rather than
the parties chooses the law. But English and most other courts use
a method that under the guise of discovering the will of the parties
"accumulates contact points," 40 a method directly opposite to the total
formulas. Every single contract. must be searched for every single
local connectio.q, and all circumstances must be pondered for a final
adjudication of the contact point of greatest weight. I agree that this
method is right when an individual contract is unusual. But for the
enormous bulk of standardized transactions of traders, producers,
manufacturers, and commercial organizations, the center has to be
ascertained typically rather than jndividually, according to the conceptions of business itself.
Can this be done effectively? There is a reassuring answer. Even
with all the multiple handicaps of present conflicts law, judicial wisdom has more often than not broken through the artificial theoretical
barriers.41
One topic, international sale of goods, has enjoyed the privilege
of a thorough elaboration by eminent committees.42 They have firmly
settled the rule that where the parties are domiciled in different
systems of law, the law of the seller's domicil should in principle
govern all the contractual obligations. Only the definition of exceptional cases in which the buyer's law should obtain was doubtful and
40

This theory was recently recognized under this name in Indiana, see 22 IND.
78 (1947).
,u The following short assertions are anticipated results of discussions contained
. in the third volume. They refer merely to the most usual situations in a preliminary
abridgment of the conclusions.
42
Vol. 2, p. 483, note 214.

L.

J.
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:finally was based on the place where the offer is received. This is
questionable. A better criterion is suggested by a series of American
- decisions dealing with. interstate F. 0. B. sales contracts. When the
goods are deliverable at the seller's factory, or at a' station, a pier, a
warehouse in his state, this state's law applies. When the shipping
point is in the buyer's state, this decides. By an excellent confirmation
of this view, when the goods are shipped F. 0. B. to a third state, the
choice of law falls back to other considerations. The courts have hereby
demonstrated an admirable feeling for the outstanding importance
which the place of shipment has in F. 0. B. and C. I. F. contracts;
regularly also the risk of loss passes with this, last positive act to be
done by the seller. We may well take the hint that the buyer's law
in overseas sales may apply only when the seller has to bring the goods,
on his own risk, to the buyer at some place across the ocean.
Agency was mistreated in conflicts law until modern legal science
clarified the presence of three separate relationships: (I) the internal
relation between principal and agent, grounded on employment, partnership, marital power or whatever else _may obligate the agent to act
in the interests of the principal; (2) thJ power of attorney or authority, flowing from private authorization or judicial decree or law, and
making the act of the- agent binding on- the principal, either directly
· and primarily, or indirectly by reflex inference, according to the common law doctrine of undisclosed principal;, and (3) the transaction
made by the agent on the ground ol,.his authority with, or in relation to,
a third party. The Restatement has evidently ,attempted to observe
this necessary trichotomy but has not succeeded in harmonizing its
fatal theory of lex loci contractus 'Yith a manifest doctrine of the courts,
which, not accidentally, conforms to the attitude of all the best courts
in the world. The existence and extent of a principal's authorization
is ordinarily determined, not by the law of the principal's domicil, nor
of the place where the authority is allegedly giv!!n,43 but by that of
the place where the agent acts.44 The American courts in trying to
reconcile this excellent result with the usual formulas, emphasize the
place where the contract with the third party is made and risk a confusion with the law governing this main contract. But such details
can be clarified. We may, fµrthermore, follow a universal judicial
tendency to the effect that employment of a servant is normally
governed by the law of that business place of the master to which
the service of the employee is attached; in the United States there
43
44

CONFLICTS RESTATEMENT,

Id.; § 345•

§ 343 (1934).
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is at least a promising trend toward this view. An analogous rule is
clearly about to gain supremacy in localizing the primarily applicable
statute for workmen's compensation In the case of an independent
employee such as a professional man or a broker, the cotitract in the
soundest opinion is centered at the place where he is established.
A most surprising agreement of the courts can be stated with respect to the various contracts of transportation. Seven or eight different
local connections were advanced in the old and extensive literature
regarding maritime carriage of goods. Scholars increasingly praised
the law of the :flag until the recent Italian Code of Navigation (1942)
adopted this law for every "utilization of ships." A great error! The
majority of the courts of all countries concerned have continuously
determined the law governing regular contracts of carriage of goods
by sea according to the port where the bill of lading is issued. In states
which have adopted the Hague Rules, without extending them to
incoming vessels as the United States does, the clear principle is that
the Rules apply to carriage on ships departing from their ports, provided that bills of lading are issued there.45 The Italian law destroys
this uniformity~
·
It follows immediately that the same rule is not suitable to charter
parties, a fact entirely disregarded by all courts but involuntarily observed in most decisions.
Scarcely necessary to observe, the courts disguise the F. 0. B. place
as "the" place of performance, the port of dispatch as the place of contracting, and the place of an agent's act as that of making the third
party contract. In the above-mentioned topics, little is needed to bring
the results into shape.
It seems to me that so pronounced, almost involuntary, trends
throughout the most competent judiciaries are a reliable sign for the
business conceptions involved. It is interesting to consider why the
nationality of a ship is treated as immaterial and the loading of the
goods against a bill of lading is decisive. We have to guess the reasons,
since the courts are inarticulate, but we may be sure that they are
realistic. At any rate, we have been provided with a considerable number of uniform points of view, conforming to the universal trend of
commercial law.
Reform

If the description of present conditions has prompted critical observations, they were offered in recognition of the fact that it is not
only in the interest of the private parties to avoid clashes between the
45

See, for instance, British Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924, s. 1, cf. art. I (b).
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rules claiming to govern their lives. A condition of state government
is involved. If forty-eight states maintain forty-eight legislatures, each
assiduously elaborating its particular socially satisfactory set of substantive requirements for marriage, the unqualified application of the
./ law of the place where a marriage is celebrated, accidentally or by
evasion, unnecessarily frustrates the intentions of the domiciliary
states.46 Coexistence of states in our federation as well as in our civilization requires continuous consideration, without which neither the Constitution nor the desired international law can guarantee peace in
private relations beyond a state boundary.
For the needed improvements, I have not made many new proposals. Most of what has been suggested in my books has been made
in the spirit of the American or international drafts born too early.
New international efforts to reform the existing laws• ought to estab, lish, for instance, a model code for the treatment of foreign corporations so as to attribute fairly suum cuique, to each his own, to the home
state and the guest state.47
A conspicuous contribution will be made by the courts when they
throw away their anachronistic modes of formulating rules. The judges
should simply say what local connection is the most important in their
opm1on.
But if I believe that judicial wisdom outranks academic speculation, I feel with equal strength that legal science has the duty to guide
the courts so as to reach the limited generalizations upon which legal
rules ·must be formed. The American literature of the last decades
has afforded admirable contributions. That additional ample information and suggestive thought are available in the united domains of
common and civil law has, I hope, been demonstrated. Whether my
individual method of analyzing and evaluating them is the best, will
be decided in the future. But it will scarcely be doubted that the
modern legal problems demand the widest range of vision, including
the fullest comparative research, and especially that sound conflicts
rules can. neither be devised nor applied in isolation. Further proof
will come forth from investigation of the treatment of propei:ty and
succession problems throughout the world.
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